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Abstract
We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollu-
tants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in
the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope.
They are regulated by distinct entities, potentially with different instruments that are designed
according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the
timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if
the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission
caps. The regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope, and not enough with economies
of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by tax
provided that the revenues from taxing emissions are redistributed to the local communities in a
lump-sum way.
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1 Introduction
Many local air pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHG) have common sources. For example, passenger
vehicles and coal power plants emit nitrogen oxides (NOx) and carbon dioxide (CO2), which affect the
local air quality and the climate. Hence, regulations directed at local air pollutants affect GHG and
vice versa. Situations in which a policy aimed at one pollutant affects emissions of another are referred
to as policy spillovers. These spillovers can lead to ancillary benefits if they act in the same positive
direction for the environment. For instance, climate policies that cause energy efficiency improvements
might lead to less fossil fuel combustion and lower emissions of local air pollutants. However, there are
also examples of climate mitigation measures that can lead to increased emissions of other pollutants.
For example, greater use of biomass in combustion sources may reduce GHG emissions but could
increase emissions of NOx and particulate matter (PM10) (see Pittel and Ru¨bbelke 2008 for a survey).
Policy spillovers clearly have implications for policy design and cost-benefit analysis, as they affect
both the effectiveness and cost of specific policy measures; failure to account for them increases the
cost of meeting a particular environmental objective, making it less acceptable to policymakers and
to the public. This concern is readily apparent in the case of China: climate change, largely ignored
as a problem in the past, has suddenly become a high national priority since the Chinese government
is realizing the opportunities to achieve climate mitigation through integration of GHG emissions
reductions into reductions of local pollution (Teng and Gu 2007, Qi et al. 2008). In November 2014,
China publicly pledged to peak GHG emission by 2030 and then remain steady or begin reduce the
levels. China’s position in the international arena stems from a recognition of the need to reduce the
country’s coal dependency, due to domestic pollution. The country has boosted its investment in wind
power, the capacity of which now exceeds that of nuclear power. Green and Stern (2015) estimate
that GHG emissions in China are likely to peak by 2025, and could well peak earlier.
The spillover effect of local pollution abatement on GHG emissions seems to be good news for the
climate. Yet it is not always the case. First, the spillovers might be negative in the sense that reducing
local pollution might increase (and not decrease) the cost of mitigating GHG emissions. For instance,
if instead of moving to renewable sources of energy China installs more scrubbers on thermal power
plants (e.g., flue-gas desulfurization devices), more energy is used, leading to higher CO2 emissions
(see e.g., Bonilla et al. 2015). Second, the spillover effect might provide perverse incentives for guiding
local environmental policy. A country might adjust its abatement strategy on local air pollution to
be in a better position in a future international deal on GHG emissions if air quality regulation would
modify the cost of abating GHG emissions (which, in turn, might affect emission caps in a Kyoto-
style agreement). Therefore, it is crucial to understand how policies can be designed such that local
pollution is reduced and global climate mitigation efforts enhanced.
In this paper we analyze the interplay between transboundary and local pollution regulations in
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the presence of policy spillovers. In particular, we analyze the question of how the choice of policy
instrument affects the stringency of the policies and economic efficiency. In our study, we assume
that in each country or, state in a federal country, there is a polluting firm that causes transboundary
and local pollution. Pollution abatement levels for both pollutants interact in the abatement cost
function of firms through economies/diseconomies of scope. Pollutants are regulated by distinct
entities at the relevant decision level (local or federal/international) with preferences in line with
society: regulators aim to maximize the social welfare of people exposed to the pollution. Inefficiency
arises only from miss-coordination among regulators. Each regulator influences the behavior of the
polluter with respect to pollution abatement by means of a variety of regulatory instruments (e.g.,
cost-efficient non-tradable quotas, emission taxes, and tradable emission permits). These regulations
can be designed either simultaneously or sequentially. In such a setting, each regulator’s policy has
the potential to affect the other regulator’s welfare. However, as we show in the paper, whether or
not that happens depends on the type of policies chosen by the regulators.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the effects of the choice of
policy instruments under policy spillovers and regulation of multiple pollutants. Our paper relates,
however, to various literatures. For example, it builds on the literature on regulation of multiple
pollutants when those pollutants interact in abatement costs or environmental damages (see, e.g.,
Moslener and Requate 2007, Legras 2011, Burtraw et al. 2012, Ambec and Coria 2013, Fullerton
and Karney 2014, Antoniou and Kyriakopoulou 2015, and Stanlund and Son 2015). Most of such
literature compares the efficiency of several instruments designed by one regulator who is in charge of
the two pollutants or only one (the regulation of the other pollutant being exogenous). In contrast,
we deal with two regulators, each of them in charge of a different pollutant since our focus is on policy
spillovers. Hence, we are able to characterize the additional sources of inefficiency that might arise
due to multigovernance of pollution control.
Our paper also relates to the literature on environmental federalism, which attempts to find the
socially optimal assignment of environmental policy to the different tiers of government. Centralized
decision-making can better exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods, and can better
internalize spillovers across local jurisdictions (e.g., Williams 1966, Oates and Schwab 1988, Gordon
1983, Williams III 2012). In such literature, researchers consider only one pollutant that diffuses
imperfectly across states. In contrast, our analysis considers two pollutants: one local managed by
the state, and one that crosses the state’s borders controlled at the federal level. Our focus is not on
what level of government should optimally regulate pollution, but on the interplay between regulation
of local pollution at the state or country level and regulation of transboundary pollution at the federal
or international level.
Our paper is related to the literature on international environmental agreements (IAE) pioneered
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by Barrett (1994). A feature we share with this literature is the assumption that the abatement
efforts implemented in an IAE maximize the total welfare of its members. However, contrary to this
literature, our focus is not on the incentives to participate into an IAE, but rather on how participation
affects the domestic regulation of air quality depending on the technology.1 Few recent papers have
study how a future IAE impact domestic policy. For instance, Beccherle and Tirole (2011) show that
delaying binding climate change agreements will induce countries not only to engage in suboptimal
efforts to reduce their current emissions but also to commit to higher pollution levels post-negotiations.
In the same vein, Harstad (2015) points out that future climate negotiations hold up countries’
investments in R&D related to GHG abatement technologies, thereby leading to underinvestment.
Our paper identifies further inefficiencies due to countries’ strategic behavior when a future climate
agreement is expected: the ones related to local air pollution. They arise when a global target for GHG
reduction is implemented through cost-efficient non-tradable abatement quotas: countries distort the
stringency of local pollution regulation to obtain lower abatement obligations in the future climate
agreement. The departure from first-best regulation depends on the economies or diseconomies of
scope parameter; countries under-abate (over-abate) local air pollution when there are economies
(diseconomies) of scope between abatement on transboundary and local pollution in order to increase
the marginal cost of abating the transboundary pollutant and thus to reduce the abatement quota.
Such a strategic manipulation of local environmental policy does not arise when the GHG reduction is
implemented through emission taxes provided that the tax is collected and redistributed to countries
by an international organization in a lump-sum way. When the tax on emissions is levied and kept
by the country, we end up with the same distortion on local air pollution as with quotas. In such
case, a country does not internalize the impact of its choice of regulation stringency on global welfare
through abatement costs. This result goes against Weitzman’s (2014) argument that taxing emissions
to resolve the global warming problem is better than a cap-and-trade system because a country has a
self-interest in collecting taxes. In our framework with policy spillovers between local and global air
pollution, the first-best outcome can be reached with cap-and-trade but not with a tax if countries
are assigned the revenue from taxing global pollution in a non-lump-sum way.
Several papers have pointed out the perverse incentives of ‘grandfathering” rules in the initial allo-
cation of tradable emissions permits. Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005) shows that firms distort strategically
their own emissions to obtain more permits in the future. Similarly, in Harstad and Eskeland (2010),
firms purchase too much permits to signal higher abatement costs, hence be assigned more emission
allowances. We obtain similar perverse incentives when the initial allocation of permits are related to
1Previous studies have also analyzed the strategic implications of policy spillovers for participation in international
climate agreements (see, e.g., Finus and Ru¨bbelke 2013). They find that in the presence of ancillary benefits, the
relative importance of an international agreement for climate protection is reduced since ancillary benefits already
provide incentives for protection in a non-cooperative setting.
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the level of local pollution. However, in our case, local authorities (and not firms) would modify their
policy on local pollution to obtain more permits for transboundary pollution. Furthermore, contrary
to the above papers, the distortion is not always in the same direction: local pollution can be higher
or lower than first-best depending on the economies of scope embedded in the abatement technology.2
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on common agency and coordination.3 A basic
assumption of this literature is that the various regulatory agencies are only able to contract in
their own sphere of responsibilities. Under this complex structure, the regulatory process introduces
allocative inefficiencies since an individual regulator does not take other regulations into account when
designing his own regulation. Within this literature, the closest paper to ours is Baron (1985). He
analyzes a model where the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), acting as a Stackelberg leader,
regulates pollution, and a public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has
private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives. In the resulting equilibrium,
pollution control is carried beyond the first best and output is too low. Our problem differ in several
dimensions. In particular, local pollution is regulated in our setting not the price. Furthermore,
although Baron consider only one firm, we deal with several firms regulated by the EPA, who are
therefore interacting with many local regulators. We complement Baron’s analysis by exploring the
robustness of this inefficiency result to the sequence of moves among regulations and the type of
instrument. Importantly, contrary to Baron’s result, in our setting, the allocative efficiency disappears
if the EPA moves first because the federal regulator internalizes the coordination failure among local
regulators.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. It also characterizes pollution
abatements for both pollutants absent any international obligation on transboundary pollution and
the first-best outcome for a given target on transboundary pollution. Section 3 analyses the impact
of several policy instruments on pollution: abatement quotas (or emission caps), emission taxes, and
tradable emission permits. Section 4 investigates the robustness of our results to the existence of a
dominant country that has a large impact on global pollution. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2In the same vein, the literature on the “green paradox” examined how future climate policy impacts on current
fossil fuel extraction (see van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2015, for a review). We differ from this literature by focusing
on the choice of environmental regulation by a welfare-maximizer government rather than fossil fuel extraction by
profit-maximizer firms or countries.
3Common agency games with complete information were introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1996). See Mar-
timort (1996) for a review of the literature.
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2 Model
2.1 Main assumptions
We have a continuum of countries or states or local regulators. Let call them “countries”. In each
country there is a polluting firm that causes transboundary and local pollution. Firms can jointly
reduce the local pollutant (denoted pollutant 1) and the transboundary pollutant (denoted pollutant
2). The total cost of reducing emissions is denoted C(q1, q2, ω), where qi denotes pollution abatement
in pollutant i for i = 1, 2. We assume the following quadratic functional form:
C(q1, q2, ω) =
mq21
2
+
mq22
2
+ ωq1q2. (1)
The parameter ω measures the degree to which there are economies or diseconomies of scope in joint
abatement in each country. Formally, there are economies of scope if C(q1, q2, ω) < C(q1,0, ω) +
C(0, q2,ω), which happens with our functional form if and only if ω < 0. There are diseconomies of
scope if the reverse holds. We refer to the economies and diseconomies of scope as complementarity
or substitutability in abatement efforts. If ω < 0, the two pollutants are complements in the cost
function in the sense that reducing emissions of one pollutant decreases the marginal cost of reducing
emissions of the other. Reversely, if ω > 0, the two pollutants are substitutes because reducing
emission of one pollutant increases the marginal cost of reducing the other.4 For simplicity, we
assume that the pollutants area symmetric in terms of their abatement costs. The spillover parameter
ω is distributed in the range Ω ≡ [ω, ω] according to a probability density f(ω) and cumulative F (ω)
where dF (ω) = f(ω)dω, and f(ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, we assume m > 0, m2 − ω2 > 0 to
ensure that C(q1, q2, ω) is increasing and strictly convex in (q1, q2): Ci > 0 and Cii > 0 for i = 1, 2
where Ci and Cii denote the first and second derivatives with respect to qi.
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Let a country’ benefit from reducing emissions be denoted
B(q1(ω), Q2) = a1q1(ω)− b1
2
[q1(ω)]
2
+ a2Q2 − b2
2
[Q2]
2
, (2)
where Q2 is the aggregate level of abatement of pollutant 2:
Q2 =
∫ ω
ω
q2(ω)dF (ω). (3)
4Note that in our model, pollutants can be either technological complements or substitutes depending on whether
abatement technologies allow for joint abatement or they can reduce certain pollutants at the cost of increasing the
output of at least one other pollutant. However, emissions can also be considered as complements or substitutes if the
inputs that cause these emissions in the production process are complements or substitutes in the usual sense. Since
the choice of the input mix has to be done simultaneously, it is clear that also abatement decisions can in general not
be made separately for each pollutant.
5Similar assumptions on the cost function are used by Stranlund and Son (2015), Ambec and Coria (2013), Burtraw et
al. (2012), and Moslener and Requate (2007), who study the optimal regulation of multiple pollutants.These assumptions
imply that the second-order conditions of the maximization programs hold.
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Note that
dQ2
dq2(ω)
= 0 because a country’s abatement has a negligible impact on the aggregate abate-
ment of the transboundary pollutant Q2. Hence, in our model there is not strategic interaction across
countries but between the stringency of transboundary and local regulation for individual countries.
We assume that B(q1(ω), Q2) is increasing and concave in its main arguments, i.e., Bi > 0 and
Bii ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. Countries differ only in the interaction parameter ω in the cost function.
Before examining regulatory instruments, let us analyze pollution abatement in two cases: without
any international agreement or regulation on transboundary pollution and under the cost-efficient
solution for a given global abatement target.
2.2 Pollution abatement without regulation of transboundary pollution
In the absence of any commitment at the international (or federal) level for pollutant 2, each coun-
try ω chooses the abatement levels q1(ω) and q2(ω) that maximize own welfare B(q1(ω), Q2) −
C(q1(ω), q2(ω), ω) subject to the non-negativity constraints on abatement qi(ω) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2 with
Q2 defined in (3). With λ
0
i denoting the Langrangian multiplier associated with the non-negative
constraint on qi(ω) for i = 1, 2, we obtain the following first-order conditions:
B1(q
0
1(ω), Q
0
2) = C1(q
0
1(ω), q
0
2(ω), ω)− λ01,
B2(q
0
1(ω), Q
0
2)
dQ2
dq2(ω)
= C2(q
0
1(ω), q
0
2(ω), ω)− λ02,
plus the complementary slackness conditions derived from the two non-negativity constraints. First,
recall that
dQ2
dq2(ω)
= 0 because a country’s abatement has a negligible impact on the aggregate abate-
ment of the transboundary pollutant Q2. Second, our assumptions ensure an interior solution for local
abatement: q01(ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω and therefore λ01 = 0. Hence, with our functional forms, the
first-order conditions become:
a1 − b1q01(ω) = mq01(ω) + ωq02(ω), (4)
0 = mq02(ω) + ωq
0
1(ω)− λ02. (5)
A country equalizes the marginal benefit of abating each pollutant to its marginal cost, which depends
on both pollutants through the interaction parameter ω. The marginal cost is net of λ02 (which is the
implicit cost of the non-negativity constraint for the transboundary pollutant). Therefore, even if the
marginal benefit of abating the transboundary pollutant is zero, a country might want to reduce it
because it reduces the cost of abating local pollution. However, this turns out to be the case if and
only if ω < 0, i.e., under economics of scope in abatement. Indeed, if λ02 > 0, then q
0
2(ω) = 0 and (5)
becomes ωq01(ω) = λ
0
2 which is compatible with q
0
1(ω) > 0 if and only if ω > 0. In this case, we know
by equation (4) that abatement of local pollution is:
q01(ω) =
a1
b1 +m
.
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In contrast, when ω < 0, we have λ02 = 0 and thus (5) becomes q
0
2(ω) = − ωmq01(ω), which, combined
with (4), leads to:
q01(ω) =
a1m
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 , (6)
and
q02(ω) =
−a1ω
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 . (7)
Therefore, total abatement of transboundary pollution in the absence of any international agreement
is:
Q02 =
∫ 0
ω
qe2(ω)dF (ω) =
∫ 0
ω
−a1ω
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 dF (ω).
This is to say, even in the absence of a regulation on transboundary pollution there will be some
positive level of abatement since countries for which the pollutants’ abatement are complements freely
choose to abate transboundary pollution only because it reduces the cost of abating local pollution.
Empirical studies have shown that the existence of ancillary benefits of climate change mitigation
might lead to significant reductions of GHG emissions. For instance, Parry et al. (2014) estimate
that the existence of ancillary benefits of climate policy on local pollution mitigation should lead the
top 20 emitters to unilaterally (and without a need to wait for global regulations) reduce their GHG
emissions by 13.5 percent (which implies a 10.8 percent reduction in global emissions).
2.3 The regulated solution with an exogenous global target on transbound-
ary pollution
We examine cost-efficient abatement efforts for both pollutants for a given abatement target for
transboundary pollution Q¯2. This assumption on cost-efficient solution is in line with the literature
on international environmental agreements and the Coase Theorem: the negotiation among countries
lead to an ex-post efficient outcome (see e.g. Beccherle and Tirole, 2011, Harstad 2015). It is also
what a federal environmental agency is meant to do. We refer to the target Q¯2 as first best even
though we assume it exogenous (though it is endogenized later in Section 3.3). As shown later, Q¯2 is
higher than the unregulated aggregate abatement Q02.
Given Q¯2, the optimal allocation of abatement efforts {q1(ω), q2(ω)}ω∈Ω maximizes the expected
total welfare: ∫ ω¯
ω
[
B(q1(ω), Q¯2)− C(q1(ω), q2(ω), ω)
]
dF (ω),
subject to the non-negativity constraints qj(ω) ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2 and the target constraint:∫ ω
ω
q2(ω)dF (ω) ≥ Q¯2.
The Langrangian of the above program is:
L =
∫ ω¯
ω
[
B(q1(ω), Q¯2)− C(q1(ω), q2(ω), ω) + k∗
[
q2(ω)− Q¯2
]
+ λ∗1q1(ω) + λ
∗
2q2(ω)
]
dF (ω),
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where k∗ denotes the multiplier associated with the target constraint and λ∗i the multiplier associated
with the non-negativity constraint for pollutant i for i = 1, 2. With {q∗1(ω), q∗2(ω)}ω∈Ω denoting the
solution to the program, we obtain the following first-order conditions:
B1(q
∗
1(ω), Q¯2) = C1(q
∗
1(ω), q
∗
2(ω), ω)− λ∗1,
k∗ = C2(q∗1(ω), q
∗
2(ω), ω)− λ∗2,
for every ω ∈ Ω. For the local pollutant, the marginal benefit of abatement should be equal to the
marginal cost (net of the shadow value of the non-negativity constraint) in each country ω. For the
transboundary pollutant, marginal abatement costs (net of the shadow value of the non-negativity
constraint) should be equal among countries and equal to the shadow value of the target. This is
to say, the target Q¯2 should be decomposed into individual abatement efforts q
∗
2(ω) per country to
satisfy the equimarginal principle.
Assume an interior solution for abatement of the two pollutants so that the non-negativity con-
straints are not binding and λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 = 0 (the assumption of interior solution is discussed later).
Substituting the functional forms for abatement benefits and costs, we obtain:
a1 − b1q∗1(ω) = mq∗1(ω) + ωq∗2(ω),
k∗ = mq∗2(ω) + ωq
∗
1(ω),
for every ω ∈ Ω. This leads to:
q∗1(ω) =
a1m− ωk∗
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 , (8)
q∗2(ω) =
k∗ [b1 +m]− a1ω
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 , (9)
for every ω ∈ Ω. For ω = 0, i.e., no interaction between the two pollutants, equations (8) and (9)
simplify to q∗1(0) =
a1
b1 +m
and q∗2(0) =
k∗
m . Thus, the abatement of the local pollutant q
∗
1(ω) does
not depend on the transboundary pollution target Q¯2. For ω 6= 0, it does. A higher target Q¯2
means a higher common marginal cost k∗ to reach it, which impacts the marginal cost of abating
the local pollutant. If the two pollutants are complements, i.e., ω < 0, it becomes cheaper to abate
pollutant 1 so q∗1(ω) increases. Reversely, if pollutants are substitutes, meaning ω > 0, abatement of
transboundary pollution makes abatement of local pollution more expensive. Thus, q∗1(ω) decreases
with a higher target Q¯2.
As shown in appendix A, for a given global abatement target Q¯2, abatement of both pollutants
decreases with ω regardless of its sign. In particular, for two interaction parameters ω− and ω+ of
the same magnitude |ω+| = |ω−| but different sign ω+ > 0 > ω−, cost-efficient abatement is always
higher for both pollutants when they are complements rather than substitutes: q∗1(ω
−) > q∗1(ω
+)
and q∗2(ω
−) > q∗2(ω
+). This is because the equimarginal principle requires more abatement from
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countries with the lowest abatement cost and therefore with the lowest ω. Hence more abatement is
required from countries where pollutants are complements than from countries where pollutants are
substitutes.
Before examining environmental regulations, we discuss the assumption of an interior solution for
abatement in the first-best solution. Comparing (6) and (8) shows that the non-negative constraint
is binding when ω > ma1
k∗ . It might hold when the two pollutants are substitutes and the global
abatement target Q¯2 is high (so that k
∗ is high compared to ω). In this case, the target Q¯2 is so high
that abatement of local pollution becomes too costly and, therefore, q∗1(ω) = 0 for every ω >
ma1
k∗ .
Symmetrically, comparing (7) and (9) indicates that q∗2(ω) = 0 whenever ω >
k∗
a1 [b1 +m]: abatement
of the transboundary pollution is too costly. Let us assume that ω¯ ≤ min
{
ma1
k∗ ,
k∗
a1 [b1 +m]
}
to
guarantee an interior solution in which abatement of both pollutants is required in the first-best
solution. Similarly, for expositional convenience, we assume that the conditions for an interior solution
in abatement are met throughout the rest of the paper.
3 Local regulation in the shadow of future global regulation
on transboundary pollution
We analyze a country’s or local regulator’s pollutant 1 abatement effort under the expectation that the
transboundary pollutant 2 will be regulated later on. The choice of instrument and its stringency is
exogenous and perfectly forecasted by local regulators.6 We consider different regulatory instruments
aimed to implement the global abatement target Q¯2: differentiated non-tradable emission quotas at
the country level (Section 3.1), a tax on emissions and tradable emission permits (Section 3.2). We also
endogenize the abatement target Q¯2 in Section 3.3. Note that emission caps e¯(ω) can be expressed
in terms of abatement and therefore referred to as abatement quotas, i.e., e¯2(ω) = e
0
2(ω) − q¯2(ω),
where e02(ω) denotes uncontrolled emissions of the transboundary pollutant and q¯2(ω) represents the
abatement quota for every ω ∈ Ω. In what follows, we consider the differentiated non-tradable
abatement quotas.
3.1 Differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas
The global regulator commits to assign country-specific abatement quotas based on a cost-efficient
allocation of the global abatement target. Given the timing of regulation, cost-efficiency is achieved
6A related study is Burtraw et al. (2012), who analyze the choice of policy instruments faced by an environmental
regulator of a specific pollutant who anticipates subsequent regulation by a different regulator of another pollutant
resulting from the same production process. Unlike our study, they assume that there is uncertainty regarding the
choice of instrument and the stringency of the global regulation.
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ex post: after each country has set its own regulation on the local pollutant. This is to say, the global
abatement target Q¯2 is split into local efforts q¯2(ω) in a way to equalize marginal cost of abatement of
the transboundary pollutant given the choice of abatement for local pollutant q1(ω). Formally, q¯2(ω)
is such that:
C2(q1(ω), q¯2(ω), ω) = k¯, (10)
for every ω ∈ Ω, where k¯ is a shadow cost of meeting the global abatement target Q¯2 with
Q¯2 =
∫ ω¯
ω
q¯2(ω)dF (ω).
The equimarginal principle (10) links abatement of both pollutants in a country to the marginal cost
of meeting the target. Note that k∗ and k¯ differ for the same target Q2 when q∗2(ω) 6= q¯2(ω) because,
as we show later, the marginal costs of abating pollutant 2 are not the same.
Expecting that q¯2(ω) will be set such that condition (10) holds, a country of type ω ∈ Ω chooses
the abatement effort for local pollution q1(ω) that maximizes its own welfare defined by:
max
q1(ω)
B(q1(ω), Q¯2)− C(q1(ω), q¯2(ω), ω), (11)
subject to the future global regulation in equation (10). Denoted q¯1(ω), the regulation of local pollution
satisfies the following first-order condition:7
B1(q¯1(ω), Q¯2) = C1(q¯1(ω), q¯2(ω), ω) + C2(q¯1(ω), q¯2(ω), ω)
dq¯2(ω)
dq¯1(ω)
. (12)
The marginal benefit of abating pollutant 1 should be equal to its marginal cost, which is decomposed
into two terms: a direct cost (the first term on the right-hand side) and an indirect cost (the second
term on the right-hand side). The indirect cost quantifies the impact of the local regulation on the
marginal abatement cost of meeting the future quota on abatement of the transboundary pollutant.
It depends on how local regulation affects the future abatement quota q¯2(ω) and the marginal cost
of meeting the quota. The impact of local regulation on q¯2(ω) can be found by differentiating the
equimarginal principle in equation (10):
dq¯2(ω)
dq¯1(ω)
= −C12(q¯1(ω), q¯2(ω), ω)
C22(q¯1(ω), q¯2(ω), ω)
. (13)
Since marginal abatement costs are convex, C22 > 0 and the denominator is always positive. Therefore,
how q¯2(ω) varies with q¯1(ω) depends on the sign of the cross derivative C12. If C12 < 0, then the
variation is positive: a more stringent local regulation leads to more abatement of transboundary
pollution. The cross derivative being negative corresponds to complement pollutants. In this case,
the two regulations are strategic complements: a more stringent regulation of local pollution leads to
a more stringent regulation on transboundary pollution. The indirect effect of marginal cost is then
7Recall that we assume an interior solution. The non-negativity constraint on abatement can therefore be ignored.
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positive as more abatement of local pollution increases the marginal cost of abating transboundary
pollution.
Reversely, C12 > 0 in case of substitute pollutants. The variation is then negative: a more stringent
local regulation leads to less abatement of transboundary pollution. The two regulations are strategic
substitutes. The indirect effect on marginal cost is then negative because abatement of local regulation
reduces the marginal cost of abating transboundary pollution.
To sum-up, the indirect effect of local regulation on future abatement of transboundary pollution
depends on whether the two pollutants are complements or substitutes in abatement cost. This
determines whether regulations are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. The indirect effect
increases the costs of abating the local pollutant if pollutants are complements and decreases the costs
if they are substitutes.
Using our functional form, equation (13) simplifies to:
dq¯2(ω)
dq¯1(ω)
=
−ω
m
. (14)
One more unit of local pollution abatement modifies the country’s abatement of transboundary pol-
lution by −ωm . It leads to an increase of abatement q¯2(ω) if ω < 0. Reversely, less abatement q¯2(ω) is
required for the country ω when ω > 0.
Substituting (12) and solving for q¯1(ω) with the functional forms, we obtain:
q¯1(ω) =
ma1
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 , (15)
for every ω ∈ Ω. Using (15), we obtain abatement levels for transboundary pollution:
q¯2(ω) =
k¯
m
− a1ω
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 . (16)
Note that the abatement quota is always binding even with economies of scope in abatement
efforts. Indeed, when ω < 0, q¯2(ω) can be expressed as a function of the unregulated abatement effort
on transboundary pollution q02(ω) as:
q¯2(ω) =
k¯
m
+ q02(ω).
Hence, q¯2(ω) > q
0
2(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω as long as the global abatement target Q¯2 is binding so that
k¯ > 0.8
Given the target Q¯2, the comparison of equations (15) with (8) shows the departure from the
first-best solution for every country type ω ∈ Ω:
q¯1(ω)− q∗1(ω) =
ωk∗
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 .
8Furthermore, note that the assumption of a continuum of atomistic countries insures that a country’s individual
abatement decision has negligible impact on k¯.
12
With no interaction between the two pollutants ω = 0, a country cannot influence the choice of
future quota on transboundary pollution through its actual choice of local regulation. Hence, the two
abatement efforts coincide, i.e., q∗1(0) = q¯1(0) =
a1
b1 +m
. With interaction between the two pollutants
ω 6= 0, the departure depends on both the sign and the magnitude of the interaction parameter
ω. Local pollution is under-abated q¯1(ω) < q
∗
1(ω) when pollutants are complements ω < 0 and over-
abated q¯1(ω) > q
∗
1(ω) when they are substitutes ω > 0. When pollutants are complements, the country
reduces the regulation stringency for local pollution to avoid being assigned a more stringent quota
on abatement of transboundary pollution. Reversely, with substitute pollutants, the country would
be assigned a less stringent quota if it increases abatement of local pollution. Moreover, the strategic
effect of domestic regulation on the future quota on abatement of transboundary pollution increases
with the magnitude of the interaction parameter ω since the departure from the first-best solution
increases with the absolute value of ω.9 Furthermore, the departure from the first-best solution is
higher for a more stringent global abatement target Q¯2 as the difference between q¯1(ω) and q
∗
1(ω)
increases with the shadow value of the first-best solution k∗.
Note that the same outcome would be achieved if the local pollutant were regulated with a tax
on emissions τ1(ω) rather than a quota q¯1(ω) for each country ω ∈ Ω. Since the tax is levied by the
country itself, it does not show up in its objective function; it is paid by firms but redistributed to
local firms or consumers. In this case, the tax rate that maximizes country ω’s welfare satisfies the
following first-order condition:
B1(q
τ
1 (ω), Q¯2)
dqτ1 (ω)
dτ1
= C1(q
τ
1 (ω), q2(ω), ω)
dqτ1 (ω)
dτ1
+ C2(q
τ
1 (ω), q2(ω), ω)
dq2(ω)
dqτ1 (ω)
dqτ1 (ω)
dτ1
,
which, after simplifying, boils down to the condition (12).
We thus are able to enunciate the first result.
Proposition 1 Under differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas for transboundary pollution, coun-
tries over-abate local pollution compared with the first-best abatement if pollutants are substitutes and
under-abate local pollution if pollutants are complements.
Hence, the way abatement of transboundary pollution is shared among countries does impact the
stringency of local pollution regulation when the two pollutants interact in abatement cost. Here it
is done in a cost-efficient way ex post, i.e., once the regulation on local pollution has been designed.
Since the stringency of the local regulation impacts the marginal cost of abating the transboundary
pollutant, countries influence their assigned abatement quota q¯2(ω) by modifying the abatement cost.
By increasing the marginal cost of abating the transboundary pollutant, a country is required to abate
9Formally, differentiating q¯1(ω)−q∗1(ω) with respect to ω leads to
k∗
[
mb1 + m
2 + ω2
][
mb1 + m
2 − ω2]2 > 0. Therefore, q¯1(ω)−q∗1(ω)
is increasing in ω when ω is positive and q∗1(ω)− q¯1(ω) is decreasing with ω when ω is negative.
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less. Marginal cost is increased (decreased) with more abatement of the local pollutant when pollutants
are substitutes (complements). Therefore, a country over-abates local pollution when pollutants are
substitutes and under-abates when they are complements.
As mentioned in the introduction, this result is related to the literature on countries’ strategies
under the expectation of a future climate agreement, which studies how pre-negotiation policy decisions
are made with an eye on the future negotiations. For instance, Beccherle and Tirole (2011) make the
point that unilaterally abating GHG emissions puts a country in a bad position for future negotiations.
Similarly, Harstad (2015) shows that future climate change deals deter innovation since countries hold
upon their R&D investment efforts. In our paper, the stringency of the local regulation causes similar
effects: if the transboundary and local pollutants are complements (substitutes) in abatement, the
countries put themselves in a bad position for future negotiations by increasing (decreasing) the
abatement of the local pollutant. Hence, with regards to the first-best abatement efforts, they under-
abate (over-abate) the local pollutant in order to strengthen their positions.
For transboundary pollution, the departure from the first-best abatement with quotas in a given
country ω can be computed as the difference between (9) and (16):
q¯2(ω)− q∗2(ω) =
[
k¯ − k∗] [mb1 +m2]− k¯ω2
m
[
mb1 +m
2 − ω2] . (17)
It is decomposed into two terms in the numerator. The first term is the same for all countries
regardless of ω and depends on k¯ − k∗, which is the difference between the marginal costs under
differentiated quotas and the first-best solution. It is strictly positive because marginal costs are by
definition minimized under the first-best solution (and the two solutions differ as long as ω > 0 for
some ω ∈ Ω). The second term is negative and depends on the magnitude of ω but not on its sign.
Since both abatements quota q¯2(ω) and q
∗
2(ω) sum up to the same target, the second term should
dominate the first term when ω is large. This means that countries whose ω is large in absolute terms
will under-abate compared with the first best. In contrast, countries whose ω is close to zero will be
asked to over-abate global pollution, because then q¯2(ω)− q∗2(ω) ≈ k¯−k
∗
m > 0.
Using (17), we can compute the threshold absolute value of ω for which the two abatement levels
coincide:
ω˜ =
√
[k¯ − k∗] [mb1 +m2]
k¯
.
We thus have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas on transboundary pollution, there
exists a threshold ω˜ on the cost interaction parameter ω that defines whether countries under-abate
or over-abate transboundary pollution compared with the first-best solution: they over-abate if |ω| < ω˜
and under-abate if |ω| > ω˜.
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When transboundary pollution is expected to be regulated under differentiated non-tradable quotas
that minimize abatement costs, countries strategically regulate their local pollution to impact their
future quota. This strategic effect reduces efficiency and thus increases the abatement cost of reaching
a given global abatement target. Those who suffer the most from this increased cost are countries with
a low interaction parameter because they are asked to abate more than with the first-best solution.
Countries with a high interaction parameter benefit from the strategic effect: they manage to get less
stringent abatement quotas than the first-best solution.
Before moving on to emission tax, we want to stress that this strategic effect of environmental
regulation arises because abatement quotas are assigned cost-efficiently. The effect would disappear
if the assignment rule were unrelated to abatement costs, for instance with abatement quotas defined
per capita or GDP. If in our model, emission reductions per capita were to be the same, each country
would abate the same, defined as q¯2(ω) = Q¯2 for every ω ∈ Ω.10 In such a case, countries would
take the abatement of global pollution as given and the local regulation would be set at an efficient
level, i.e., by equalizing the marginal benefit of abatement to its marginal cost. However, the cost
of achieving the target Q¯2 would not be minimized as abatement costs are not equalized. Yet the
relative performance of these two second-best policies is not obvious.
As shown in Appendix B, countries for which pollutants are substitutes would prefer differentiated
quotas as in such case they obtain more abatement of local pollution and less abatement of trans-
boundary pollution. In contrast, countries for which pollutants are complements are better off with
uniform quotas.
3.2 Tax on transboundary pollution and tradable emissions permits
Let us assume that the global regulator commits to achieve the same abatement target Q¯2 with a
(uniform) tax τ2 on emissions of the transboundary pollutant 2 instead of abatement quotas. Abate-
ment levels qτ2 (ω) will be such that firms equalize the marginal abatement cost for the transboundary
pollutant to the tax rate in every country ω ∈ Ω:
C2(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω) = τ2. (18)
Importantly, assume further that a country’s emissions do not impact its share of revenue collected
from taxing emissions, e.g., the revenue is shared equally among countries or redistributed according
to a rule that does not depend on emissions. Let us first assume that countries set quantity targets
for abatement of local pollution, e.g. emission caps. Country ω chooses the abatement effort q1(ω)
that maximizes its benefit net of abatement cost and tax payments:
B(q1(ω), Q¯2)− C(q1(ω), qτ2 (ω), ω)− τ2
[
e02(ω)− qτ2 (ω)
]
, (19)
10Recall that, with a continuum of countries of mass one, total abatement Q2 is also the average abatement level.
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where qτ2 (ω) satisfies (18) for every ω ∈ Ω. The first-order condition yields:
B1(q1(ω), Q¯2) = C1(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω) + [C2(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω)− τ2]
dqτ2 (ω)
dq1(ω)
. (20)
Country ω chooses the abatement effort such that the marginal benefit of abating pollution equals its
marginal cost. The marginal cost is composed of the direct (first right-hand side term) and indirect
(second right-hand side term) effects of a future choice of global pollution abatement qτ2 (ω). Now,
however, one more unit of global pollution abatement qτ2 (ω) has two impacts: it increases the marginal
abatement cost and reduces tax payments. The two impacts cancel out since the global abatement
target will be chosen such that the marginal abatement cost of each country C2(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω) equals
the tax rate τ2. Thus, the first-order condition (20) leads to the cost-efficient condition in every country
ω ∈ Ω:
B1(q1(ω), Q¯2) = C1(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω). (21)
Hence, for a given global abatement target Q¯2, the first-best solution is implemented with a tax on
transboundary pollution of τ2 = k
∗ per unit of emission. Such a tax rate would lead each country
ω ∈ Ω to implement an abatement quota q∗1(ω). The firm in country ω binds the quota by abating
q∗1(ω). Moreover, each country will choose abatement q2(ω) such that the marginal cost of abatement
equalizes the tax rate τ2. We thus obtain the first-best abatement levels of both of the local and
transboundary pollutants.
The first-best outcome can also be achieved if the local pollutant is regulated with a tax on
emissions τ1 rather than a quota on abatement. The tax rate implemented by a country of type
ω maximizes the same objective as in (19). The choice of abatement of local pollution satisfies the
following first-order condition:
B1(q1(ω), Q¯2)
dq1(ω)
dτ1
= C1(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω)
dq1(ω)
dτ1
+ [C2(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω)− τ2]
dq2(ω)
dτ1
,
which, after decomposing
dqτ2 (ω)
dτ1
=
dqτ2 (ω)
dq1(ω)
× dq1(ω)
dτ1
and simplifying, boils down to the efficiency
condition (21).
It is worth mentioning that the revenue from taxing emissions of transboundary pollution should
not be assigned to the country. Otherwise, the payment of the tax disappears from the local regulator’s
objective in (19) (last term). The tax would then be missing in the first-order condition (20) which
determines regulation stringency of the local pollutant. The first-order condition (20) would then
become similar to condition (12) and, therefore, we end up with the same distortion in regulation
stringency as with differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas. We thus conclude that to obtain
efficiency, each country should pay for the externality its activities generate on transboundary pollution
through emission taxes.
Finally, the first-best solution can also be achieved by using tradable emission permits rather that
taxing the transboundary pollutant. The intuition is similar as for the tax instrument. Assume that
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each country or firm is assigned l2(ω) units of tradable emission allowances. Denote by q
t
2(ω) the level
of abatement effort of the firm in country ω for every ω ∈ Ω. The initial allocation of permits must
achieve the global abatement target:
Q¯2 =
∫ ω
ω
[
e02(ω)− l2(ω)
]
dF (ω) =
∫ ω
ω
qτ2 (ω)dF (ω), (22)
where the last equality is due to the permit market-clearing condition. The firm in country ω chooses
abatement levels denoted qt2(ω) = e
0
2(ω) − l2(ω) to equalize the marginal abatement cost for the
transboundary pollutant to the equilibrium price of permits in every country ω ∈ Ω:
C2(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω) = p2. (23)
Country ω’s objective when choosing abatement effort q1(ω) now includes the net position of firms in
the permit market:
B(q1(ω), Q¯2)− C(q1(ω), qτ2 (ω), ω)− p2
[
e02(ω)− l2(ω)− qτ2 (ω)
]
, (24)
where qt2(ω) and p2 satisfy (23) for every ω ∈ Ω as well as the market-clearing condition (22). Since
each firm or country has a negligible impact on the price of emission allowances p2, the first-order
condition yields:
B1(q1(ω), Q¯2) = C1(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω) + [C2(q1(ω), q
τ
2 (ω), ω)− p2]
dqτ2 (ω)
dq1(ω)
− p2 dl2(ω)
dq1(ω)
(25)
for every ω. This first-order condition is similar to (18) with the price of emission permits p2 instead
of the tax τ2. The last term
dl2(ω)
dq1(ω)
captures the impact of abating local pollution on the initial
allocation of emission permits. It is nil when the initial allocation of permits is unrelated to local
pollution (e.g. allowances are allocated per capita, GDP or auctioned off). In such case, the first-order
condition boils down to the efficiency condition (21) since the permit price is equal to marginal cost.
Since the total number of permits is defined by the abatement target Q¯2, the equilibrium permit price
is p2 = k
∗. We thus obtain the first-best: qτi (ω) = q
∗
i (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω and every pollutant i = 1, 2.
Yet permits might be initially allocated according to a rule that depends on local pollution abate-
ment. For instance, the allocation might be proportional to abatement costs in the sense that a country
with higher abatement costs obtains more permits. Then countries will tend to distort the stringency
of their local regulations to obtain more permits. Formally, the last term remains in the first-order
condition, which means that abatement is not efficient. Since dl2(ω)dq1(ω) =
ω
m , it holds that countries
over-abate local pollution compared with the cost-efficient abatement if pollutants are substitutes and
under-abate local pollution if pollutants are complements to obtain more permits.11
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
11The fact that firms have incentives for strategic action if allocation in one period depends on previous actions is
well know in the literature. See, e.g., Sterner and Muller (2008), who show that free allocation of permits is bound to
create problems.
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Proposition 3 Regulations on local and transboundary pollution are optimal if the target on trans-
boundary pollution is implemented by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that (i)
the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries independently of emissions, and
(ii) the initial allocation of permits is not linked to abatement costs.
Unlike differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas, setting a tax on transboundary pollution
does not lead to an inefficient outcome. Even if the country takes into account the effect of its
local regulation on the cost of abating the transboundary pollutant, this cost is compensated by the
tax saved. The tax rate reflects the social marginal cost of abatement, which is the same ex post.
Therefore each country internalizes the impact of its regulation choice on the social cost of abating
transboundary pollution. To internalize this impact, the tax should be returned to countries in a
non-distortionary way. Similarly, efficiency is achieved with tradable emission permits at country
level as long as the initial allocation of permits is not influenced by local regulation. Otherwise, a
country has an interest in distorting its local regulation to obtain more permits, as with differentiated
non-tradable abatement quotas.
Before endogenizing the global abatement target Q2, let us discuss the robustness of our results
to alternative regulatory timing. We show in Appendix C that efficiency is achieved if both reg-
ulators (local and global) move simultaneously or if the global regulator moves first. This is true
regardless of the policy instrument used, i.e., differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas, tax, or
tradable emission permits. Indeed, the strategic effect of local environmental policy on transbound-
ary environmental policy disappears when the two pollutants are regulated simultaneously. When the
transboundary pollutant is regulated first, the global regulator implements a first best abatement level
because it aims to maximize social welfare at the world level. We would obtain suboptimal regulation
of transboundary pollution with a global regulator who ignores or disregards the damages of local pol-
lution, for example, because it is not in the mandate of the federal or international regulatory agency
or values the welfare of a subset of countries (e.g., because not all countries join the international
environmental agreement). When it comes to taxes, Proposition 3 holds when the two regulations are
designed simultaneously or in the reverse order, i.e., global regulator moving first.
3.3 Endogenizing the first-best target on transboundary pollution
In this section, we endogenize the choice of global abatement target by assuming that Q¯2 is set taking
into account the benefit of abating transboundary pollution. Let Q¯∗2 and Q
∗
2 denote the efficient
abatement of transboundary pollution under differentiated non-tradable quotas and under tax (or,
equivalently, tradable permits), respectively. It is common knowledge among countries and firms that
abatement of transboundary pollution will be set to maximize social welfare given regulations on local
pollution q1(ω). Abatement levels for transboundary pollution q2(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω maximize social
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welfare ∫ ω¯
ω
[B(q1(ω), Q2)− C(q1(ω), q2(ω), ω)] dF (ω), (26)
subject to Q2 =
∫ ω¯
ω
q2(ω)dF (ω). The first-order condition leads to the equalization of marginal benefit
to marginal cost for every ω ∈ Ω:
B2(q1(ω), Q2) = C2(q1(ω), q2(ω), ω), (27)
which, with our functional forms, yields:
a2 − b2Q2 = mq2(ω) + ωq1(ω). (28)
The efficiency conditions (28) are defined by different abatement levels q1(ω) depending on the
instrument used to regulate the transboundary pollutant. With differentiated non-tradable abatement
quotas, the analysis in Section 3.1 applies: countries set local regulations to induce abatement efforts
q¯1(ω) defined in (15) for every ω ∈ Ω. With a tax on transboundary pollution, we already know from
Section 3.2 that the local abatement efforts would be equal to the first-best levels q∗1(ω) defined in
equation (8), where k∗ = a2− b2Q∗2 corresponds to the social cost of carbon. Combining equation (8)
with k∗ = a2 − b2Q∗2 and (15) yields:
ω [q¯1(ω)− q∗1(ω)] =
ω2[a2 − b2Q∗2]
mb1 +m
2 − ω2 , (29)
which is strictly positive regardless of ω. Integrating condition (28) for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯] leads to
Q2 =
[a2 − E(ωq1(ω))]
b2 +m
, (30)
where E stands for the expectation operator, i.e., E =
∫ ω
ω
ωq1(ω)dF (ω).
Proposition 4 The global abatement target on transboundary pollution is lower under differentiated
non-tradable abatement quotas than under tax.
The global abatement target with tax Q∗2 is defined by equation (30) with q1(ω) = q
∗
1(ω), where
q∗1(ω) is defined in (8). The one under quota Q¯
∗
2 is also defined by equation (30), but with q1(ω) =
q¯1(ω), where q¯1(ω) is defined in (15). Using equation (29), we obtain Q¯
∗
2 < Q
∗
2: aggregate abatement
of the transboundary pollutant is lower under differentiated abatement quotas than under tax. The
reason is that differentiated non-tradable quotas distort the stringency of local regulations, which
increases the cost of abating transboundary pollution in all countries. The equalization of abatement
cost to the marginal benefit of abatement leads to less abatement and thus more emissions in total
than the first best (or with taxes). From the analysis, it also follows that since the abatement levels
differ under the two instruments and the tax implements the first best, total welfare must be lower
under quotas. Thus, the implementation of differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas will not only
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distort the stringency of local pollution abatement but also lead to under-abatement of transboundary
pollution.
We close the section with two remarks. A first remark concerns the effects of the choice of policies
to implement an international climate agreement and the incentives to deviate from it. It is well
known that the lack of an effective international government vested with effective coercive powers
makes it unlikely that adequate participation in and compliance with an international climate treaty
will be achieved. Free-riding behavior can be expressed through non-participation or non-compliance.
As shown in Appendix D, for the countries for which pollutants are substitutes and the absolute
value of ω is large, it holds that the welfare gains of non-compliance are larger when the agreement
is implemented through taxes than through differentiated non-tradable quotas. Thus, for those coun-
tries, the less cost-effective regulation is more likely to be effective in promoting participation in and
compliance with international climate agreements. Interestingly, Barrett and Stavins (2003) reach a
similar conclusion. They find that proposals that are best in terms of cost-effectiveness (conditional
on implementation) – primarily market-based instruments such as tradable permit regimes – will not
be effective in promoting participation in and compliance with international climate agreements. In
our setting, differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas provide countries for which pollutants are
substitutes (and hence, which in relative terms have the highest cost of compliance with a climate
treaty) with implicit transfers through reduced abatement responsibilities. Thus, despite the fact that
taxes can reduce costs overall, differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas are most likely to induce
compliance by countries with high costs.
Our second remark is about the choice of abatement technology. Suppose that a country could
choose which technology to support for reducing pollution, e.g. whether to subsidy renewables or to
impose scrubbers on coal power plants. Which technology would it pick? Answering fully this question
would require a fully analysis adding a first decision stage on technological choice. Nevertheless, from
our previous analysis, we can say that the incentives for implementing a particular technology depend
on the choice of policy instrument. More specifically, whether countries would individually go for
substitute or complement abatement efforts.
From a pure efficiency perspective, technologies with complement abatement efforts are better
(everything ceteris paribus) since economics of scope among abatement efforts can be exploited. More
precisely, if the choice is between two technologies with same ω in absolute value but one negative
ω− and one positive ω+ = −ω− (that can be implemented at the same cost), one should prefer
technology ω−. Our analysis shows that with tax or tradable emission permits the incentives go in
the right direction but not with differentiated non-tradable quotas. To see that, we compute the
welfare of a country ω for each instrument. Combining (1), (2), (15) and (16) leads the welfare W (ω)
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of a country ω with differentiated quota:
W (ω) =
a21m
2 [mb1 +m2 − ω2] −
k¯2
2m
+ a2Q¯
∗
2 −
b2
[
Q¯∗2
]2
2
.
It turns out that a country’s welfare depends on the magnitude of ω not its sign. It implies that a
country is indifferent between ω− and ω+, i.e. substitute or complement abatement efforts. With a
higher absolute value of ω, a country’s environmental regulation has a higher impact on its assigned
quota on transboundary pollution. Therefore countries value high absolute values of ω since it allows
them to increase their abatement costs through their choice of local pollution to obtain more rights
to emit transboundary pollution. On the other hand, countries do not benefit from having comple-
ment abatement efforts rather than substitutes because any gain from exploiting economic of scopes
are held-up by the global regulation through the assignment of more stringent abatement quotas.
This indifference between substitute and complement technologies at the country level reinforces the
inefficiency of differentiated non-tradable quotas as an instrument to deal with global pollution.
When it comes to taxes, combining (1), (2), (8) and (9 ) plus a lump sump transfer T (that
redistributes tax revenues), yields the following welfare for country of type ω:12
W τ (ω) =
a21m− [k∗]2 [b1 +m]
2 [mb1 +m2 − ω2] + a2Q¯
∗
2 −
b2
[
Q¯∗2
]2
2
− k∗ [e02(ω)− qτ2 (ω)]+ T.
The first term increases with the absolute value of ω, but it does not depend on the sign. However,
the last term is increasing with ω, thereby implying that the welfare is decreasing with ω.13 Thus if a
country had to choose between two technology with same ω in absolute value different sign, it would
go for the complement with ω negative. The same result would apply in the case of tradable emission
permits.14
4 Big country
Let us analyze how robust our results are to the assumption of atomistic countries. Indeed, it is
well known that the climate change problem is characterized by the existence of a few large emitters
such as China and the United States. To account for this in our model in a simple way, we need to
12Recall that cost-efficiency is achieved with tax or tradable emission permits and therefore we substitute the cost-
efficient abatement efforts in the country’s welfare.
13It is because qτ2 (ω) is decreasing with ω (see Appendix A). Moreover, the uncontrolled emissions of transboundary
pollution e02(ω) are expected to be larger when ω > 0 since countries for which pollutants are substitutes do not abate
at all in the absence of a global regulation.
14More precisely, with tradable emission permits, the net payments from permit transactions in a country’s welfare
would correspond to k∗
[
e02(ω)− l2(ω)− qτ2 (ω)
]
. For any l2(ω) 6= 0, welfare will be larger that under emission taxes,
yet welfare will be still larger for those countries utilizing technologies for which pollutants are complements provided
that the initial allocation of permit l2(ω) is not increasing with ω.
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rescale abatement effort. Let q2(ω) represent transboundary abatement per capita and Q2 the average
aggregate emission reduction per capita. We consider a dominant country denoted by the superscript
D. This country hosts a share µ of the global population. The share of the global population living
in the remaining countries (or federal states) is therefore equal to 1− µ. We first examine the case of
differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas studies in Section 2.3. The dominant country of type ωD
chooses an abatement level qD1 that maximizes its welfare subject to the abatement quotas per capita
on transboundary pollution for itself q¯D2 and the global level of transboundary pollution abatement per
capita Q¯2 defined by Q¯2 = µq¯
D
2 + [1− µ] Q¯−D2 , where Q¯−D2 denotes the average aggregate abatement
quota per capita for the remaining countries:
Q¯−D2 =
∫ ω
ω
q¯2(ω)dF (ω).
In such case, the first-order condition in (12), determining the optimal level of abatement of local
pollution for the dominant country ωD becomes:15
B1(q¯
D
1 , Q¯2) = C1(q¯
D
1 , q¯
D
2 , ω
D) +
[
µB2(q¯
D
1 , Q¯2)− C2(q¯D1 , q¯D2 , ωD)
] dq¯D2
dq¯D1
. (31)
Hence, if µ = 1 there will be full internalization of the transboundary externality. In contrast, if
µ = 0, we are back to our original case. Whenever 0 < µ < 1, part of the transboundary externality
is not internalized and, therefore, the outcome is inefficient.
For tradable emission permits, the question naturally arises as how our results would change
in the presence of a dominant country that can manipulate the market to its own advantage by
means of its choice of abatement of the local pollutant.16 To analyze this problem, let lD2 denote the
number of emission permits freely distributed to the dominant country. Assume further that lD2 is
determined independently of abatement costs. The dominant country chooses the abatement effort qD1
that maximizes the benefit from local abatement net of abatement cost and payments for net permit
transactions. This yields the following first-order condition:
B1(q
D
1 , Q¯2) = C1(q
D
1 , q
D
2 , ω
D) +
[
p2 − C2(qD1 , qD2 , ωD)
] dqD2
dqD1
− dp2
dqD1
[
e0D2 − lD2 − qD2
]
.
This equation differs from the case of atomistic countries in (12) by dp2
dqD1
which captures the impact
of the dominant country’s environmental policy on the price of permits. The price equalizes marginal
abatement costs in all countries as in (23). By summing up all those conditions for all countries, we
are able to express explicitly the price as a function of abatement levels from both the dominant and
the atomistic countries:
p2 = µ
[
mqD2 + ω
DqD1
]
+ [1− µ]
∫ ω¯
ω
mq2(ω) + ωq1(ω)dF (ω).
15Note that the first-order condition (12) is unchanged for all other countries.
16See Hahn (1984) for a formal analysis of such manipulation.
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Differentiating the above equation with respect to qD1 (ω), we obtain
dp2
dqD1
= µωD.
If µ = 0 we are back to the efficiency condition (21). Yet if µ > 0, the outcome is inefficient. How it
departs from efficiency depends on the interaction parameter of the dominant country and whether
the dominant country is a net buyer or a net seller in the market for permits (i.e., whether the net
demand for permits e0D2 − qD2 exceeds the initial allocation lD2 ). With economics of scope ωD < 0,
abating local pollution reduces the price of emission permits because it decreases the cost of abating
the transboundary pollutant. As a consequence, a net buyer dominant country over-abates local
pollution (while the reverse holds if the dominant country is a net seller of permits). Symmetrically,
with diseconomies of scope ωD > 0, abating local pollution increases the price of emission permits
through higher abatement costs for transboundary pollution. If the dominant country is a net buyer
(seller) of permits, it under-abates (over-abates) local pollution compared with the efficient level.
Thus, when the dominant country is a net seller of permits, we obtain results similar to those under
cost-efficient non-tradable abatement quotas described in Section 3.1. In contrast, our results indicate
that a dominant country that is a net buyer of permits will over-abate (under-abate) local pollution
when pollutants are complements (substitutes) in order to reduce the price of emission permits.
5 Conclusion
Having analyzed the interplay between local and transboundary pollution with spillovers in abatement
costs, we are able to answer the question raised in the introduction: Are the policy spillovers between
local air pollution and GHG emissions good news for the climate? Our analysis shows that the
answer depends on several ingredients: (i) whether efforts to reduce local air pollution and GHG
emissions are substitutes or complements in cost, (ii) whether GHG emissions are regulated or not at
the international level, (iii) the choice of instrument used to implement an international agreement on
GHG reduction, and (iv) the marginal impact of countries on total GHG emissions.
First, without any international obligation for GHG emissions, it is in each country’s own interest
to reduce its GHG emissions when local air pollution and GHG abatement efforts are complements.
Doing so, the country exploits economics of scope in pollution abatement. This is so even if each
country has a negligible impact on global GHG emissions. In contrast, when abatement efforts are
substitutes, countries have no self-interest in reducing GHG emissions. In fact, the regulation of local
air pollution might lead to higher GHG emissions.
Second, when GHG are regulated internationally, the choice of instrument and timing of regulation
matter. In particular, if countries expect GHG emissions to be regulated in the future through cost-
efficient non-tradable emissions caps, they have an incentive to distort the stringency of their own
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domestic regulation of local air pollution to obtain higher emission caps. Whether the regulation is
too stringent or not stringent enough depends on the sign of the spillover effect in abatement cost. In
any case, even if the emission quotas are set cost-efficient ex post (once domestic regulations of local
air pollution have been implemented), they are distorted: the same target for global GHG emissions is
achieved at a higher cost. If this target is chosen to maximize social welfare, it is set too lax compared
with the first best. In this case, the policy spillover effect is bad for the climate. A similar distortion
in local air pollution arises with a tax on GHG emissions when each country keeps all the revenue from
taxing emissions within its territory. To avoid this distortion, the revenue from taxing GHG emissions
should be assigned to a country independently of its own contribution. Similarly, the allocation of
tradable emission permits should not depend on abatement costs, e.g., per capita or GDP.
Third, the strategic distortion of local regulation is mitigated for “big” countries that have a
significant impact on global GHG emissions. Big GHG emitters would partly internalize how their
choice of local air pollution affects GHG emissions, which undermines this strategic effect. This holds
for cost-efficient emission quotas but not for tradable emission permits: a big country might distort
its local air pollution regulation to manipulate the price of permits. How it departs from the first
best depends on the dominant country’s abatement cost spillover and whether the country is a net
buyer or a net seller in the market for permits. For instance, we find that a dominant country that is
a net buyer of permits will over-abate (under-abate) local pollution when pollutants are complements
(substitutes) in order to reduce the price of emission permits. In contrast, the incentives are reversed
when the dominant country is a net seller of permits.
From our analysis, we can conclude that a country’s concerns for local air pollution is good news for
the climate in the absence of any international obligation on GHG emissions when there are economies
of scope (or ancillary benefits) in abatement costs. Furthermore, the cost interaction between abate-
ment of local and transboundary pollution matters for the choice of regulation instruments for GHG
emissions for the reasons explained above.
The model in this paper is simplified in a number of respects to keep the analysis tractable. For ex-
ample, we do not model a potential interaction between the two pollutants in the damage they cause.
Such an extension could be easily incorporated it in our model in line with the analysis of Ambec and
Coria (2013). In such case, the distortions would depend on the net effect of the interactions between
the two pollutants in damages and costs. In addition, our analysis assume perfect information. More-
over, the economies (diseconomies) of scale are assumed to be exogenous. However, firms have private
information about their abatement costs. That is, firms know whether they are more productive
reducing one of the pollutants and, if so, to what degree. Furthermore, economies (dis-economies)
are endogenous to the choice of abatement technologies installed in response to environmental regu-
lations. Finally, moral hazard, adverse selection, and endogenous technological progress are problems
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that complicate the analysis of the conflicts created by non-cooperative regulations and are as such
left as areas for further research.
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A Comparison of first-best abatements given Q¯2
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to ω yields:
q∗′1 (ω) =
2ω [a1m− ωk∗]− k∗
[
mb1 +m
2 − ω2]
[mb1 +m2 − ω2]2
. (32)
Note that a1m− ωk∗ ≥ 0 because q∗1(ω) ≥ 0 for every ω ∈ Ω. Further, m2 − ω2 > 0 by assumption.
Therefore, we can conclude that q∗′1 (ω) < 0 for every ω ≤ 0 so that q∗1(ω) is decreasing when pollutants
are complements.
Similarly, differentiating equation (9) with respect to ω yields:
q∗′2 (ω) =
2ω [k∗ [b1 +m]− a1ω]− a1
[
mb1 +m
2 − ω2]
[mb1 +m2 − ω2]2
. (33)
Note that k∗ [b1 +m]−a1ω ≥ 0 for every q∗2(ω) ≥ 0. Further, m2−ω2 > 0 by assumption. Therefore,
we can conclude that q∗′2 (ω) < 0 for every ω ≤ 0 so that q∗2(ω) is decreasing when pollutants are
complements.
Furthermore, for any ω− and ω+ such that |ω+| = |ω−| and ω+ > 0 > ω−, we have q∗1(ω−) >
q∗1(ω
+) and q∗2(ω
−) > q∗2(ω
+). Therefore, by continuity q∗1(ω) and q
∗
2(ω) are decreasing with ω when
ω > 0, i.e., when pollutants are substitutes.
B Country’s welfare comparison between cost-efficient differ-
entiated and uniform quota
Let us compare the welfare difference between uniform and differentiated quotas. For simplicity, let
us assume that ω can take two values: ω− and ω+, where ω− < 0 < ω+. For a fraction κ of the
countries ω = ω−, and hence for the remaining fraction [1− κ] it holds that ω = ω+. Under a uniform
quota, the abatement of the global pollutant corresponds to qU2 = κq
∗
2(ω
−) + [1− κ] q∗2(ω+). Hence
q∗2(ω
+) < qU2 < q
∗
2(ω
−).
Let us compare qU2 with the abatement of the global pollutant under differentiated cost-efficient
quotas q2(ω).
If ω = ω−, we have:
q2(ω
−)− qU2 =
[
q2(ω
−)− q∗2(ω−)
]
+ [1− κ] [q∗2(ω−)− q∗2(ω+)] .
The sign of the difference [q2(ω
−)− q∗2(ω−)] is not straightforward. However, by Proposition 2 we
know that it is positive when |ω−| < ω˜, and hence, q2(ω−) − qU2 > 0. Furthermore, we know that
∂q2(ω)
∂ω < 0. Hence, q2(|ω−| > ω˜) > q2(|ω−| < ω˜) and therefore q2(ω−)− qU2 > 0 ∨ ω−.
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If ω = ω+, we have:
q2(ω
+)− qU2 =
[
q2(ω
+)− q∗2(ω+)
]− κ [q∗2(ω−)− q∗2(ω+)] .
By Proposition 2 we know that q2(ω
+)−qU2 < 0 if |ω+| > ω˜. Furthermore, we know that ∂q2(ω)∂ω < 0.
Hence, q2(|ω+| < ω˜) > q2(|ω+| > ω˜) and therefore q2(ω+)− qU2 > 0 ∨ ω+.
When it comes to local pollution we know that:
q1(ω)− qU1 (ω) = [q1(ω)− q∗1(ω)] +
[
q∗1(ω)− qU1 (ω)
]
= ω
[
k∗
mb1 +m2 − ω2 +
[
qU2 (ω)− q∗2(ω)
]
m+ b1
]
.
This expression is unambiguously positive ∨ ω+, and hence q1(ω+) > qU1 (ω+). However, the compari-
son is less clear for ω−. After some further calculations, and assuming that ω− = −ω+, this expression
can be represented as:
q1(ω
−)− qU1 (ω−) = ω−
[
k∗ [m+ b1] + 2 [1− κ] a1ω−
mb1 +m2 − [ω−]2
]
.
We know that k∗ [m+ b1]+a1ω− > 0 for q∗2(ω
−) > 0. Therefore, we can say that q1(ω
−) < qU1 (ω
−)
when κ ≤ 12 .
This is to say, with regards to differentiated quotas, uniform quotas imply less abatement of local
pollution and more abatement of global pollution for the countries for which pollutants are substitutes.
The reverse holds for countries for which pollutants are complements. Finally, the difference in welfare
between uniform and differentiated quotas can be represented as ∆W1(ω), given by:
∆W1(ω) =
[
qU1 (ω)− q1(ω)
] [
a1 − [b1 +m]
2
[
qU1 (ω) + q1(ω)
]]
(34)
+
[
Q∗2 −Q
∗
2
] [
a2 − b2
2
[
Q∗2 +Q
∗
2
]]
+
m
2
[
[q2(ω)]
2 − [qU2 ]2]+ ω [q1(ω)q2(ω)− qU1 (ω)qU2 ] .
As shown in Section 3.3., Q
∗
2 < Q
∗
2. Moreover, when ω = 0 this expression simplifies to:
∆W (ω) =
[
Q∗2 −Q
∗
2
] [
a2 − b2
2
[
Q∗2 +Q
∗
2
]]
+
m
2
[
[q2(ω)]
2 − [qU2 ]2] > 0.
Finally, let us have a look at the last term. We can show that for ω+ = −ω−, this expression
corresponds to:
ω+
[
q1(ω
+)q2(ω
+)− qU1 (ω+)qU2
]
= ω+
[
a1m
[
q2(ω
+)− qU2
]
mb1 +m2 − ω2 −
[
qU2 ω
+
]
[m+ b1]
[
k∗ [m+ b1] + 2 [1− κ] aω−
mb1 +m2 − ω2
]]
.
Therefore, ω+
[
q1(ω
+)q2(ω
+)− qU1 (ω+)qU2
]
< 0 if κ ≤ 12 . Thus, countries for which pollutants are
substitutes are in relative terms worse off under uniform quotas since the first, third and fourth term
in parentheses on the RHS of equation (34) are negative.
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C Regulatory Timing
We show that optimality is achieved either when both regulators move simultaneously or the global
regulator moves first regardless of the choice of policy instruments. Let us consider first the case of
simultaneous regulation. In line with Section 3.1., the maximization problem of the global regulator
yields FOCs:
C2(q¯1(ω), q¯2(ω)) = k̂,
for every ω ∈ Ω, where k̂ is the shadow cost of reaching the target Q¯2 that could be equal to the first
best level, in which case k̂ is the marginal benefit of abating the transboundary pollutant.
Country ω chooses an abatement quota q¯1(ω) to maximize the net welfare defined in (11). Since
the abatement quotas are decided simultaneously, dq¯2(ω)dq¯1(ω) = 0 and hence equation (12) simplifies to:
B1(q¯1, Q¯2) = C1(q¯1(ω), q¯2(ω)). (35)
Therefore, the first best is achieved since countries choose an abatement quota q¯1(ω) such that the
marginal benefit of abating pollution equals the marginal costs and the global regulator chooses
abatement quotas q¯2(ω) such that countries equalize their marginal cost to the marginal benefit of
abating the transboundary pollutant 2.
Let us consider now the case of sequential regulation where pollutant 2 is regulated before pollutant
1 through differentiated quotas q¯2(ω). Since country ω takes the stringency of the quota q¯2(ω) as given,
the quota q¯1(ω) that maximizes welfare is such that the marginal benefit of abating pollution equals
the marginal costs. In contrast, the quota q¯2(ω) that maximizes the global regulator’s optimization
problem satisfy the following FOC:
[
k̂ − C2(q1(ω), q2(ω))
]
+
[
B1(q1, Q¯2)− C1(q1(ω), q¯2(ω))
] dq¯1(ω)
dq¯2(ω)
= 0. (36)
However, since B1(q1, Q¯2) = C1(q1(ω), q2(ω)) we end up with the efficient FOC. The same ar-
gument shows that the first best is achieved with a tax on local pollution 1 rather than abatement
quotas.
Simultaneous implementation of taxes will also lead to first best. The firm in country of type ω
reacts to the tax rate τi for pollutant i by equalizing its marginal abatement cost to the tax rate for
i = 1, 2:
τi = Ci(qi, qj , ω). (37)
The global regulator chooses the tax rate τ2 to maximize social welfare at the world level (26) subject
to the reaction functions defined by (37). This yields the following FOC:
[B2(q
τ
1 , Q2)− C2(qτ1 , qτ2 , ω)]
dqτ2
dτ2
+ [B1(q
τ
1 )− C1(qτ1 , qτ2 , ω)]
dqτ1
dτ2
= 0, (38)
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As discussed in Section 3.2., the tax rate τ1 that maximizes country ω
′s welfare satisfies the
following FOC:
[B1(q
τ
1 )− C1(qτ1 , qτ2 , ω)]
dqτ1
dτ1
− [C2(qτ1 , qτ2 , ω)− τ2]
dqτ2
dτ1
= 0. (39)
Given (37), the FOC in (39) simplifies to B1(q
τ
1 ) = C1(q
τ
1 , q
τ
2 , ω). Hence, the FOC in (38) becomes
B2(q
τ
1 , Q2) = C2(q
τ
1 , q
τ
2 , ω), implying that the first best is achieved when regulators decide on the tax
levels τ1(ω) and τ2 simultaneously.
Finally, let us consider the case when both pollutants are regulated by taxes and the global
regulator moves first. Like in the simultaneous case, country ω chooses a tax level τ1(ω) such that
the marginal benefit of abating pollution equals the marginal costs. In contrast, the tax level τ2 that
maximizes the global regulator’s optimization problem satisfies the following FOC:
[B2(Q
τ
2)− C2(qτ1 , qτ2 , ω)]
dqτ2
dτ2
+ [B1(q
τ
1 )− C1(qτ1 , qτ2 , ω)]
dqτ1
dτ2
= 0. (40)
However, since B1(q
τ
1 ) = C1(q
τ
1 , q
τ
2 , ω), this condition simplifies and thus the tax τ2 is set at a level
such that countries equalize their marginal cost to the the marginal benefit of abating pollutant 2.
D Welfare variation from participating in an international
agreement on transboundary pollution
We assume that a country ω that deviates from the international agreement chooses the abatement
levels q01(ω) and q
0
2(ω), which maximize welfare in the absence of international regulation of global
pollution. In contrast, the global aggregate abatement corresponds to the first best Q∗2 and can
be implemented through differentiated non-tradable abatement quotas or a carbon tax. Let WL(ω)
denote country ω′s welfare when deviating from the agreement. Moreover, let W (ω) and W ∗(ω)
denote country ω′s welfare when the agreement is implemented through differentiated non-tradable
abatement quotas and taxes, respectively.
The welfare gains of deviating from an agreement that implements Q∗2 through taxes are larger
than the welfare gains of deviating when the agreement is implemented through quotas if:
WL(ω)−W ∗(ω) > WL(ω)−W (ω). (41)
Condition (41) simplifies to:
∆W2(ω) = W (ω)−W ∗(ω) > 0.
Given the functions of abatement benefits and costs and the lump sum transfer T (that redistributes
the emission taxes ), ∆W2 can be represented as:
∆W2(ω) = [q1(ω)− q∗1(ω)]
[
a1 − [b1 +m]
2
[q1(ω) + q
∗
1(ω)]
]
+
m
2
[
[q∗2(ω)]
2 − [q2]2
]
+ω [q∗1(ω)q
∗
2(ω)− q1(ω)q2] + τ2
[
e02(ω)− q∗2(ω)
]− T, (42)
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which simplifies to:
∆W2(ω) =
[
ωk
]2 −m [b1 +m] [[k]2 − [k∗]2]+ 2mk∗ [mb1 +m2 − ω2] [e02(ω)− q∗2(ω)]− T. (43)
Note that ∆W2(ω) is decomposed into four terms. The first term is positive and depends on the
magnitude of ω but not on its sign. The second term is negative since the difference
[
k − k∗] is strictly
positive. The third term is positive since the difference
[
e02(ω)− q∗2(ω)
]
is strictly positive for every
ω ∈ Ω. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix A, q∗2(ω) is decreasing with ω for every ω ∈ Ω, implying
less abatement of transboundary pollution by the countries for which pollutants are substitutes. In
addition, the uncontrolled emissions of transboundary pollution e02(ω) are expected to be larger for
those countries since they do not abate at all in the absence of a global regulation. Finally, the lump
sum transfer T does not depend on ω.
Thus, we can conclude that ∆W2(ω) is decreasing with ω for every ω ∈ Ω and that it is larger for
countries for which pollutants are substitutes.
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